How well do countries cope with the aftermath of natural disasters? In particular, how well do international financial flows buffer economic losses from disasters? This paper focuses on hurricanes (one of the most common and destructive types of disasters), and examines the impact of hurricane damages on resource flows to affected countries. Due to the potential endogeneity of disaster damage, I exploit instrumental variables constructed from meteorological data on hurricanes. Instrumental variables estimates indicate that disaster damages lead to increases in national-level net inflows of migrants' remittances, foreign lending, and foreign direct investment. These types of flows respond rapidly, within the first year after damages. Official development assistance (ODA) also responds positively to hurricane damage, but with a lag of roughly two years. On average, total inflows from these sources within the following four years amount to roughly four-fifths of estimated damages. The null hypothesis of full insurance of hurricane disaster damages cannot be rejected. By contrast, ordinary least squares estimates find essentially no response of international flows to disaster damages, highlighting the importance of an instrumental variables approach in this context.
Introduction
Natural disasters cause tremendous losses of human life, as well as substantial economic damages.
From 1970 to 2001, natural disasters killed an estimated 2.69 million people, injured another 2.65 million, and led to US$955 billion in economic damages worldwide (see Table 1 ).
1 Individual disasters, too, can have appalling tolls; the 1970 hurricane in Bangladesh killed some 300,000
people. It is not uncommon for estimated economic losses from disasters to amount to substantial fractions of countries'economic output. For example, damages from the 1973 drought in Burkina Faso amounted to 104% of gross domestic product, while those from Hurricane Mitch in Honduras in 1998 came to 38% of GDP. More generally, 39% of world population lives in countries that had experienced disaster damages of 3% of GDP or more in some year between 1970 and 2001.
Given the destructive power of many natural events, and their largely unpredictable nature, it is important to understand how countries cope with the aftermath of disasters. This paper examines how international …nancial ‡ows bu¤er the economic losses from natural disasters. In particular, I focus on damage caused by hurricanes, one of the most common and destructive types of disasters. 2 Wind storms, the disaster type that includes hurricanes, caused an estimated 611,000 deaths, 517,000 injuries, and US$278 billion in damages worldwide from 1970 to 2001.
71% of world population lives in 'hurricane-exposed' countries: those hit by hurricanes or that were within 100 miles of a hurricane center at some point during that time period. 3 Of course, geographically large countries such as China, India, or the U.S. may have hurricane-exposed areas but have substantial fractions of their populations far from such areas. If one limits the country sample to geographically smaller countries, those with less than 250,000 square kilometers in land area, 4 then 51% of population is located in hurricane-exposed countries.
A key contribution of this paper is to take a worldwide view in examining systematically the impact of disaster damage on international …nancial ‡ows. I examine four types of ‡ows-o¢ cial development assistance (ODA), foreign loans, migrants' remittances, and foreign direct investment-and estimate the responses of such ‡ows to disaster damages, on average across many countries. Surprisingly little research exists on this topic. Existing work uses small, selected 2 While 'hurricanes'typically refer to events in the Atlantic and eastern Paci…c, I use the term in this paper to encompass similar events that are known elsewhere as 'typhoons'and 'tropical cyclones'. 3 Author's calculation using meteorological data on hurricanes to be described in Section 2.2. Population data are for 2001 , from World Development Indicators 2004 With this size cuto¤, the largest countries remaining are the U.K. (240,880 sq. km.) and Guinea (245,720 sq. km.).
samples, and so is not likely to be globally representative. Benson and Clay (2004) , in a case study of three countries, …nd that disasters had little impact on total foreign aid ‡ows. AlbalaBertrand (1993) studies 28 individual natural disaster occurrences, and …nds that capital ‡ows and unrequited transfers typically increase after the events; however, the sample is a selection of 28 severe disasters, and may not be representative of more 'typical'disasters.
A central concern in estimating the impact of disaster damage is that reported disaster damages provided by national governments or international organizations may be in ‡uenced by the desire to attract …nancial in ‡ows. For example, damage estimates may be exaggerated when international in ‡ows are expected to be small, leading estimates of the impact of damage on …nancial ‡ows to be understated. In addition, unobserved third factors may in ‡uence both international ‡ows and the size of damages su¤ered (if disasters occur), also potentially leading to biased estimates.
An innovation of this paper is its approach to dealing with the potential endogeneity of disaster damage reports. I use objective meteorological data on hurricane events to construct instrumental variables for disaster damage. The occurrence of hurricanes is highly predictive of disaster damages experienced by countries in particular years, and it is plausible that hurricanes have their e¤ect on …nancial ‡ows primarily via the damages they cause.
Instrumental variables estimates indicate that disaster damages lead to increases in nationallevel net in ‡ows of migrants'remittances, foreign lending, and foreign direct investment. These types of ‡ows respond rapidly, within the …rst year after damages. O¢ cial development assistance (ODA) also responds positively to hurricane damage, but with a lag of roughly two years. On average, total in ‡ows from these four sources amount to roughly 80% of estimated damages. The null hypothesis of full insurance of disaster damages by these types of international ‡ows cannot be rejected. By contrast, ordinary least squares estimates …nd essentially no response of these international ‡ows to disaster damages, highlighting the importance of an instrumental variables approach in this context. This paper is part of a currently quite thin literature on the economics of disasters. Kahn (2005) examines heterogeneity in the impact of natural disasters on disaster deaths, focusing on the role of institutions in moderating death tolls. Hines and Jaramillo (2004) examine the impact of natural disasters on economic growth. 5 5 While not explicitly about disasters per se, Miguel, Satyanath, and Shanker (2004) is also related in that it uses rainfall shocks to instrument for economic growth in estimating the impact of growth on civil con ‡ict. Paxson (1992) examines the impact of rainfall shocks on household savings in rural Thailand.
Two highly related bodies of research are those on risk-sharing arrangements at the international level, on the one hand, and among individual households in rural communities, on the other. On the international level, research tends to conclude that there is relatively little smoothing of national-level consumption variability via international risk-sharing arrangements (for example, Tesar (1993 Tesar ( , 1995 ). On the other hand, there is substantial microeconomic evidence of risk-sharing (although not complete insurance) among households in developing countries (for example, Townsend (1995) , Udry (1994) , and Ligon, Thomas, and Worall (2002) ). This paper provides evidence that certain types of international ‡ows appear to share risk across countries in the aftermath of disaster events.
Finally, this paper's …ndings on the response of migrants'remittances to disaster damage relate to research on migration as a risk-coping mechanism for households in poor countries. Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) document the risk-reducing aspects of the spatial distribution of daughters after marriage in rural India. At the international level, it is commonly posited that remittance ‡ows from overseas bu¤er economic shocks in the migrants'home countries (for example, Ratha 2003) , but this claim has been empirically untested until now.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background on hurricanes worldwide, and discusses the data on hurricanes. Section 3 considers the theoretical role of international …nancial ‡ows ‡ows in sharing risk (in particular, disaster risk) across countries.
Section 4 discusses relevant econometric issues, presents the empirical evidence, and conducts several robustness checks. Section 5 discusses the magnitude of the empirical results. Section 6 concludes. Hurricanes only originate over warm tropical waters with a surface temperature of at least 79 degrees F (26 degrees C). Therefore, due to cooler sea surface temperatures, hurricanes never form in the South Atlantic Ocean or the eastern South Paci…c Ocean. In addition, formation of hurricanes requires a zone of low barometric pressure in combination with rotating winds (a 'vortex'), ruling out hurricane formation and persistence within 5 degrees of the equator: the earth's Coriolis force is too weak near the equator to generate su¢ cient rotating winds. Surrounding the eye are spiral arms of storm clouds. The spiral-shaped area of weather disturbance can be anywhere from 60-900 miles (roughly 100-1,500 km.) in diameter, but the area of hurricane-force winds is typically smaller. Formation of hurricanes can take place over several days, or as quickly as within 12 hours. Hurricanes will typically last 2-3 days, with the broader storm (including periods with less than hurricane-force winds) lasting for 4-5 days in total.
Hurricanes wreak damage of three general types. First, hurricanes are accompanied by a storm surge, a rise in the sea level due to wind-driven waves and low atmospheric pressure. Storm surges can range from 4 feet (1.2 meters) for the smallest hurricanes to 18 feet (5.5 meters) or more for the strongest ones. They are usually the most deadly aspect of hurricanes, and also cause extensive property damage alongside destruction of crops and salt contamination of agricultural land. The storm surge caused by the 1970 Bangladesh hurricane was reported to have reached 30 feet (9 meters). Second, strong winds can cause substantial structural damage as well as defoliation of crops. The third type of damage is due to ‡ooding due to heavy rainfall, which can also cause landslides in sloped areas. While the storm surge and winds are strongest near the eye of the hurricane, the e¤ects of ‡ooding can be felt hundreds of miles away and can last well beyond the dissipation of hurricane-force winds.
Hurricane data
Objective data on hurricanes worldwide are available from two U.S. government agencies: the (wind speed and barometric pressure). These best tracks incorporate information from a variety of sources, such as reconnaisance aircraft, ships, and satellites. While best tracks may be reported as far back as 1851, the data quality is likely to be highest since the early 1960s and the widespread use of meteorological satellites (Chu et al 2002) . The best track data naturally take hurricanes as the unit of analysis, and so in their raw form
give no indication of the countries which may have been a¤ected. However, the empirical analysis to follow will take place at country level, and on an annual basis (the unit of observation is a country-year). So I construct two types of hurricane event variables at the country-year level.
The …rst is a count of hurricane 'landfalls' in a given country and year. I de…ne a landfall as occurring when the center of a hurricane crosses the border of a country. Second, I make use of counts of hurricane 'near-landfalls', which I de…ne as a hurricane center passing within 100 miles (160 kilometers) of a country's borders. The use of near-landfalls acknowledges that hurricanes can have large e¤ects on countries via heavy rains and ‡ooding that can extend much further than the storm surge and strong winds near the eye.
8 Table 2 displays the number of hurricane landfalls and near-landfalls for each country that experienced at least one of either event between 1970 and 2001. 9 There are a total of 570 landfalls and 564 near-landfalls during the time period. Countries in the table are sorted according to region, country size category, landfalls, and near-landfalls. (The country size category is included because the empirical analysis to follow will examine heterogeneity in the impact of hurricanes along this dimension.) The country with the largest number of landfalls is the Philippines, with 7 Detailed descriptions of these data …les are provided in Jarvinen et al (1984) , Davis et al (1984) , and Chu et al (2002) . The data …les from these two sources have been placed in a consistent format by Unisys Weather and are publicly accessible at <http://weather.unisys.com/hurricane/index.html>.
8 Identi…cation of landfalls and near-landfalls requires the hurricane best tracks to be overlaid with a world map that includes political boundaries of countries. This was accomplished using ArcGIS software. The best tracks used are simply line segments connecting 6-hourly hurricane centers. A line segment was considered a 'hurricane segment'if hurricane-force winds were achieved at either of the two endpoints of the line segment.
9 My use of the term 'country'encompasses territorial bodies such Puerto Rico, Guam, and Mayotte that are not independent states, as data are often collected separately for such entities.
90, followed by China (86), Japan (62), Mexico (47), the United States (40), Australia (39), Vietnam (34), and Madagascar (16) . Among 'small' countries, the countries with the largest numbers of landfalls are Vanuatu (9), New Caledonia (7), the Bahamas (5), Guam (5), Fiji (5), and the Dominican Republic (4). Asterisks indicate that a country will not be included in the empirical analyses to follow because it lacks the necessary data on other variables. 71 countries are listed in Table 2 , of which 58 have su¢ cient data to be included in the empirical analysis for at least one outcome.
The impact of disaster damage in theory
When a country experiences a major disaster, how should we expect international …nancial in ‡ows to change? A basic theoretical result is that if there is a Pareto-e¢ cient allocation of risk across individual entities (in this case, individual countries) in a risk-sharing arrangement, individual consumption should not be a¤ected by idiosyncratic income shocks.
Consider 
, for all i, j, s t , and t,
where ! i and ! j are the Pareto weights of countries i and j. Countries'marginal utilities are proportional to each other, and so consumption levels between countries move in tandem.
Let utility be given by the following constant absolute risk aversion function:
Then, following (among others) Mace (1991) , Cochrane (1991), Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotliko¤ (1992) and Townsend (1994) , we can obtain a relationship between individual country i's consumption and average consumption across countries c st :
E¢ cient risk-sharing implies that individual countries'consumption levels depend here only on mean world consumption c st and an e¤ect determined by the country's Pareto weight relative to other countries'. Because this latter term is constant over time, then changes in consumption for particular countries will depend only on the change in mean world consumption. Said another way, countries face only aggregate global risk.
The key question is whether idiosyncratic risk or aggregate risk dominates in practice, as this will determine the extent to which consumption can be smoothed. The empirical analysis to follow will examine the impact of disaster damage from hurricanes, which are by their nature only local (not global) phenomena. So in principle one might expect substantial ability of countries to smooth consumption in the face of hurricane-related disaster risk.
How might this cross-country risk-sharing be carried out in practice? First, countries might simply make unrequited transfers or gifts to other countries experiencing negative shocks. Microeconomic studies among households of the insurance role of gifts and remittances include Lucas and Stark (1985) , Ravallion and Dearden (1988) , Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) , Platteau (1991), and Cox, Eser, and Jimenez (1998) . Second, countries could make loans to one another. Among others, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) , Kletzer (1984) and Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) have underlined the function of sovereign debt as a smoothing device. 10 And third, transfers of assets across countries can be a way of sharing risk.
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Adapting Fafchamps and Lund (2003) , let consumption of country i in state s t be the sum of income y So then we can rewrite equation (1) as: 
The empirical test of this paper will be based on equation (3), where the outcome variables are net transfers, net borrowing, and asset changes separately, as well as the sum of all these ‡ows. Speci…cally, the net transfer measures will be net o¢ cial development assistance, and net remittances from overseas migrants. Net borrowing will be loans minus repayments from international lenders. And asset changes will be represented by net foreign direct investment and net portfolio investment. This paper will focus on a particular type of transitory shock z i st , damages from disasters, using instrumental variables constructed from hurricane events. It is of interest to examine which of the potential types of international …nancial ‡ows-transfers, loans, or asset sales-appear to respond positively to disaster damages (and thus act as insurance).
Two additional null hypotheses will be useful to test, when the outcome variable in equation (3) is taken to be all types of international ‡ows combined. First, is the coe¢ cient on in ‡ows with respect to damages z i st greater than zero? If yes, then this will be evidence that at least some insurance is taking place. Second, can we reject the null of full insurance, i.e., that the coe¢ cient on z i st is equal to one?
Empirical evidence
This section documents the impact of disaster damage (instrumented by hurricane landfalls and near-landfalls) on international …nancial ‡ows. I …rst describe other data sources used in the empirical analysis, and then describe summary statistics. I then present the empirical results from the …rst stage analysis (predicting disaster damage using hurricane instruments) and the second stage IV analysis (impact of disaster damage on international …nancial ‡ows). The remainder of the empirical section conducts several robustness checks.
Other data sources
Aside from the data on hurricane events described above, another crucial type of data required is on disaster damages experienced by countries over time. I use disaster damage data from EM-DAT: the CRED/OFDA International Disaster Database, maintained by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Université Catholique de Louvain.
12 Estimated disaster damages are reported at the country-year level, in currency units. These estimates include both direct costs (such as damage to property, infrastructure, and crops) and the indirect losses due to reductions in economic activity. Disaster damage estimates are meant to correspond only to the year of the associated event, and not ongoing e¤ects that persist beyond the disaster year.
In subsidiary analyses, I also use data on number of people killed from EM-DAT.
The sources of disaster impact data in EM-DAT are varied, and include national governments, 12 These data are available at <www.em-dat.net>. 13 The empirical analysis takes 1970 as the starting year, but examines lagged e¤ects of disaster damages up to 4 years before.
Foreign direct investment is net in ‡ows in the reporting country less net out ‡ows by the reporting country of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the investor. Portfolio investment encompasses transactions in equity and debt securities, and excludes liabilities constituting foreign authorities'reserves (LCFAR). Data on net ‡ows of migrants'remittances are from IMF Balance of Payments Statistics 2004, and are the sum of separately-reported items for workers' remittances, compensation of employees, and migrants'transfers.
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The following adjustments are made to these data. All …gures reported in currency amounts are converted to 1995 US dollars using GDP de ‡ators in WDI 2004 and the 1995 local currency/US dollar exchange rate. To facilitate analysis of data across economies of vastly di¤erent sizes, the data on disaster damages and international …nancial ‡ows will be expressed as fractions of GDP.
Because disasters may also a¤ect the denominator of these statistics (the level of GDP), I use GDP in prior years as the denominator. In particular, because I will be interested in the e¤ects of disaster damages up to 4 years before, I use mean GDP from 5, 6, and 7 years prior to a given observation as the denominator for all damage and international ‡ow variables. An analogous adjustment is made for the number of people killed due to disasters, where the denominator is mean population in the 5-7 years prior.
Finally, I drop countries from the analysis for a given outcome variable if data for that outcome is available for less than three years between 1970 and 2001 for that country. This change does not a¤ect the empirical results, as the outcomes for countries that have only one or two observations of non-missing data are entirely explained by the country …xed e¤ect and the country-speci…c linear time trend. To maximize relevance for the samples for the main outcome variables, in summary statistics tables I drop observations that lack su¢ cient data for inclusion in any of the international ‡ow outcome regressions.
The resulting samples contain between 3,121 and 4,016 observations (depending on the outcome variable), and between 127 and 170 countries. The countries that actually experience hurricane landfalls or near-landfalls are listed in Table 2 . The remaining countries serve as controls, and primarily contribute to the estimates by improving the estimates of global year …xed e¤ects.
The panel is unbalanced, with the number of observations varying across countries depending on data availability. Table 3 presents summary statistics for the observations included in the analyses. The top third of the table presents summary statistics for all observations. Summary statistics for disaster damage and hurricane events are for all observations included in at least one international ‡ow regression. Disaster damage as a percentage of GDP has a mean of 0.72%, and the mean in levels is US$234 million. On average across country-year observations, two out of 100,000 inhabitants were killed due to disasters. The means of hurricane landfalls and near-landfalls are 0.118 and 0.097, respectively. ODA as a share of GDP has a mean of 8.78%, but in some countries this …gure is quite high: the 90th percentile of this variable is 22.55%. Other variables appear more evenly distributed worldwide. The mean of remittances as a share of GDP is 2.82%, with a 90th percentile of 7.81%. Mean net …nancial ‡ows as a share of GDP is 2.61%, and the corresponding …gures for FDI and portfolio investment are 2.13% and -0.03%, respectively.
Summary statistics
The remaining thirds of Table 3 present corresponding summary statistics, but separately for observations with a hurricane landfall or near-landfall (middle third of table) and for observations without any such hurricane events (bottom third). It is clear that countries experiencing some hurricane event report greater damages as a share of GDP (the mean is 2.11%) than those without a hurricane event (where the mean is 0.55%), as well as larger fractions of population killed.
However, the basic means do not provide a consistent indication of whether international ‡ows are larger for the hurricane-a¤ected observations. For example, mean ODA as a share of GDP is higher in observations without a hurricane event, while mean FDI as a share of GDP is higher among hurricane-a¤ected observations. Of course, such comparisons have no necessary causal interpretation: it could simply be that hurricane-prone countries have higher or lower international ‡ows for reasons independent of hurricanes (such as their general development status).
First-stage estimates: impact of hurricanes on disaster damage
In examining the impact of disaster damage on international …nancial ‡ows, disaster damage reports compiled in the EM-DAT database cannot plausibly be taken, in and of themselves, as exogenous with respect to the outcomes in question. For example, reverse causation is likely to be a problem. If large …nancial in ‡ows are occurring in response to disasters, countries or international agencies have no need to exaggerate damage …gures. But when ‡ows are not forthcoming, disaster damages may be exaggerated to attract more resources. This would lead the estimated e¤ect of damage on …nancial in ‡ows to be negatively biased. There may also be omitted variable problems, as when worsening economic conditions or a breakdown of government functions leads to declines in …nancial in ‡ows and an increase in vulnerability to disasters (perhaps due to deteriorating disaster warning systems, deteriorating infrastructure, declines in property maintenance, etc.).
To deal with problems of reverse causation or omitted variables, this paper uses an instrumental variables approach. I instrument for disaster damage with events that are plausibly exogenous with respect to the international ‡ows of interest: hurricane landfalls and near-landfalls.
As the …rst-stage outcome to be instrumented will be disaster damage as a share of GDP, the impact of a hurricane is likely to be heterogeneous according to a country's physical size: a hurricane striking a country as large as China (with an area of 9,327,450 sq. km.) is likely to have a much smaller impact as a share of GDP than a similar event striking a small country like Belize (22,800 sq. km.). So I will use as instruments the number of hurricane landfalls and nearlandfalls, as well as these variables interacted with indicators for di¤erent country size groups, de…ned roughly by quartiles of the worldwide distribution of land areas: small-medium countries, with between 60,000 and 250,000 sq. km. in land area; medium-large countries, between 250,000 and 770,000 sq. km.; and large countries, with land area greater than 770,000 sq. km. The omitted category will be small countries, with less than 60,000 sq. km. in land area. 16 For disaster damage as a share of GDP in country i and year t, DAM it , the …rst-stage regression equation will be as follows:
it is the number of hurricane landfalls in country i and year t, while H N it is the corresponding number of near-landfalls. SIZEQ2 i , SIZEQ3 i , and SIZEQ4 i are dummy variables for the second through fourth country land area quartiles (small-medium, medium-large, and large, re-spectively). Country …xed e¤ects i control for time-invariant di¤erences across countries. Year …xed e¤ects t control for changes common to all countries in the same year. T REN D is a linear time trend. Country-speci…c time trends ( i , the coe¢ cient on a country indicator D i interacted with the time trend) help account for the e¤ect of slow-moving changes over time that occur throughout the sample period, and that di¤er across countries. " jt is a mean-zero error term.
Serial correlation in the outcome variables is likely to be a problem in this panel dataset, biasing OLS standard error estimates downward (Bertrand, Du ‡o and Mullainathan (2004) ), so standard errors allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance structure within countries (standard errors are clustered by country).
is the impact of a hurricane landfall on deviations from countryspeci…c trends in disaster damage as a share of GDP for 'small' countries, and the coe¢ cients 2 through 4 represent the di¤erence in the impact of a hurricane landfall for countries in the corresponding larger size category (with respect to the impact for 'small' countries). The coe¢ cients 5 through 8 on the near-landfall variable H N it and interaction terms are interpreted analogously. Table 4 presents results for estimation of equation (4). The sample is limited to observations with complete data on o¢ cial development assistance as a fraction of GDP. Column 1 of the table presents results without the inclusion of the country size interaction terms. Both hurricane landfalls and hurricane near-landfalls lead to increases in disaster damage as a share of GDP. The estimates are individually statistically signi…cant (landfalls at the 5% level and near-landfalls at the 10% level), and jointly statistically signi…cant at the 5% level (according to an F-test reported at the bottom of the table). Each hurricane landfall leads to increases in disaster damage in the same year of roughly one-half percent of GDP. While the point estimate on hurricane near-landfalls is more than three times the size as the point estimate for landfalls (0.0174), standard errors are too large to reject the hypothesis that the two coe¢ cients are equal in size.
Column 2 of the table presents regression results where the country size interaction terms are included. The hurricane landfalls main e¤ect (representing the impact for countries in the smallest size group) has become four times larger in magnitude compared to the previous regression, and is statistically signi…cant at the 10% level. Coe¢ cients on the hurricane landfall interaction terms are negative and of increasing magnitude as land area increases, indicating that the impact of landfalls on damage relative to GDP declines with land area. Coe¢ cients on the two largest country size interaction terms are each statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. The patterns exhibited by the hurricane near-landfalls variables are qualitatively very similar, although none of those coe¢ cients are individually statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
As a group, the hurricane landfall and near-landfall variables and associated interaction terms are strong instruments. The F(8,147)-statistic of the test of joint signi…cance of the eight instruments is 2.24, with a p-value of 0.028.
The second-stage instrumental variables results will examine the impact of instrumented disaster damage not only in the current year, but also for up to four years before. So the actual …rst stage regression equation will be analogous to equation (4) above, but including also lagged hurricane landfall and near-landfall variables and interaction terms for 1 to 4 years before. Table 5 presents results for estimation of this expanded version of equation (4) where the outcome variable is current-year disaster damage as a share of GDP. The coe¢ cients in the …rst column are for the instruments in the current year, and so are analogous to those in column 2 of Table 4 . The results for these coe¢ cients are very similar to those in column 2 of Table 4 , and the current-year instruments jointly achieve similar levels of statistical signi…cance (the F-test of joint signi…cance has a p-value of 0.0154). As might be expected, instruments in other years are not jointly statistically signi…cant (according to reported F-tests), and are rarely individually statistically signi…cant.
17 The F-test of the joint statistical signi…cance of all 40 hurricane variables and interaction terms has a p-value of 0.0000, suggesting that weak instrument issues are not a problem in this setting.
18 Table 5 is the …rst stage for disaster damage in the current year. Disaster damage 1 through 4 years before are estimated using analogous regressions but for damage as a share of GDP in the corresponding prior years. Results are not shown due to space considerations, but they o¤er no surprises: instruments for given years are only jointly statistically signi…cant when they correspond to the year of disaster damage (i.e., instruments for 2 years before are only signi…cant when the outcome is disaster damage 2 years before), and F-tests for the joint signi…cance of all instruments routinely reject the null hypothesis at high signi…cance levels.
17 One seemingly anomalous result is the coe¢ cient on the number of hurricane landfalls in year -3 for smallmedium countries, which is positive and statistically signi…cant at the 10% level. This coe¢ cient turns out to be entirely driven by two countries which experienced very large disaster damage three years after a hurricane landfall (Honduras in 1974 with 52% damage, and Laos in 1993 with 23%). The main results to follow are not driven by these countries: repeating the analysis when excluding Honduras and Laos removes the anomalous …rst-stage coe¢ cient but yields second-stage results very similar to those to be presented later. 18 As noted above, the …rst-stage regression results in Tables 4 and 5 are for the sample of observations included in the second-stage regressions for ODA as the outcome variable. First-stage regressions for the samples corresponding to the other outcome variables do not di¤er in substantial ways.
Instrumental variables estimates: impact of disaster damage on international …nancial ‡ows
The …rst stage regressions with hurricane landfalls, near-landfalls, and country-size interaction terms as instruments (as in Table 5 ) allow construction of predicted damage as a share of GDP for country i in year t, d
DAM it , as well as predicted damages 1 to 4 years before:
DAM it 3 , and d DAM it 4 . These predicted damages are the independent variables of interest in a regression speci…cation based on equation (3) above. The instrumental variables regression equation for international …nancial ‡ows Y it for country i in year t is:
As in the …rst stage equation, the second-stage equation also includes country …xed e¤ects, year …xed e¤ects, and country-speci…c linear time trends. The country-speci…c linear time trends are useful to separate the e¤ect of disaster damages from the in ‡uence of long-running time trends in outcome variables in particular countries.
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The coe¢ cients of interest are 1 through 5 on current and lagged predicted damage as share of GDP. 20 Because both dependent and independent variables are expressed as fractions of GDP (from 5-7 years before), these coe¢ cients should be interpreted as 'replacement rates'. (For example, a coe¢ cient of 0.1 would be a replacement rate of 10%.) Table 6 presents both ordinary least squares and instrumental variables estimates of the impact of disaster damage on …ve types of international …nancial ‡ows (each in a separate regression).
Panel A of the table presents OLS results, and Panel B the IV results.
While the coe¢ cients on disaster damage in the OLS results are mostly positive in sign, they are all very small in magnitude (in no case are they larger than 0.021 in absolute value) and mostly not statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero (except for damages 1 to 4 years before in the FDI regression and for damages 4 years before in the remittance regression).
The IV estimates, on the other hand, tell a very di¤erent story. For four out of the …ve types 19 While these would not be necessary if hurricane events themselves showed no apparent time trends, it turns out that hurricane landfalls and near-landfalls do appear to have become more common in aggregate over the course of the 32-year period of analysis. An OLS regression (with 32 observations) of the number of hurricane landfalls in each year from 1970 to 2001 on a constant and a linear time trend yields a coe¢ cient on the time trend of 0.35 (std. err. 0.12), and an R-squared of 0.2283. 20 The instrumental variable estimates are actually calculated in a one-step procedure using STATA's ivreg command.
of …nancial ‡ows (all except portfolio investment), net in ‡ows respond positively to instrumented disaster damages. The coe¢ cients on current and lagged damages in the ODA regression are all positive in sign, with the coe¢ cient for damage 2 years before being largest in magnitude and statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. This coe¢ cient indicates a large replacement rate of damages 2 years before by ODA of 0.196.
Coe¢ cients on damages in the current year and 1 year before are also all positive where the outcome variables are net …nancial ‡ows, remittances, and FDI. Statistical signi…cance at conventional levels is achieved in the net …nancial ‡ows and remittance regressions for damage in the current year and 1 year before, with coe¢ cients ranging from 0.073 to 0.179. In the FDI regression, only current-year damages are statistically signi…cant at the conventional level, with a coe¢ cient of 0.171. For portfolio investment, on the other hand, the coe¢ cients on damages are all substantially smaller in magnitude, actually negative in sign, and never statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Alternative subsamples
It is important to test the robustness of the main empirical results in alternative subsamples. Table 7 presents regression results from a range of additional speci…cations of the main regression equation (5), for the four types of international ‡ows that appear to respond to disaster damages:
ODA, net …nancial ‡ows, remittances, and FDI.
In the …rst row of the table, the most statistically signi…cant regression coe¢ cients from Table 6 (the original sample) are presented for each of the four outcome variables: the coe¢ cient on damage 2 years before for ODA, on damage 1 year before for both net …nancial ‡ows and remittances, and on damage in the current year for FDI. The remaining rows of the table display the corresponding coe¢ cients when the estimates are conducted using alternative subsamples.
The samples used in the regressions of Table 6 are unbalanced: the countries included in the sample vary substantially in the number of observations, ranging from 3 to 32 observations over the 1970-2001 period of analysis. A concern may be that country-speci…c time trends may not be estimated well when countries have few observations included in the sample. In addition, one might be concerned that patterns of entry into and exit from the sample of countries with few observations may be driving the empirical results. So the second row of Table 7 presents coe¢ cient estimates when the sample is restricted to countries that have data on the given outcome variable for 10 or more years. The results provide no indication that the presence of countries with very few observations in the main regressions a¤ects the fundamental conclusions. All coe¢ cients remain positive and highly statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, and are very similar in magnitude to the corresponding coe¢ cients in the original sample. Tables 4 and 5 indicate that the impact of hurricanes on disaster damage as a share of GDP is largest for countries with the smallest land area. It is thus worth asking whether the main empirical results hold mainly for the subsample of smaller countries.
The …rst stage results of
So the next set of results in Table 7 presents coe¢ cient estimates separately for the sample of countries with land area less than 250,000 sq. km. (roughly the sample median), and for countries above this threshold. The coe¢ cient estimates for the subsample of smaller countries appear very similar in magnitude and statistical signi…cance to those in the original sample. This is in stark contrast to results for the larger subsample of countries: indeed, three out of the four coe¢ cient estimates are actually negative (with the exception of that in the FDI regression). That said, the coe¢ cient estimates for the larger-country subsample are very large, so that not a great deal further can be said about how they di¤er from the original regression results. Nonetheless, it is probably fair to conclude that the original regression results are indeed driven by the smaller countries in the sample.
Finally, it seems worthwhile to examine how the results di¤er when looking separately at the countries by development status, as reliance on international ‡ows to cope with disasters may vary on this dimension. The …nal two rows of Table 7 present coe¢ cient estimates for the sample of less-industrialized countries, on the one hand, and for the highly industrialized countries on the other. 21 Net …nancial ‡ows and ODA are primarily ‡ows from multilateral funding institutions and donor agencies, and are zero for all industrialized countries, so no regression results are reported for these cells. For the remaining two outcomes, the results also appear to be driven by less-industrialized countries. The coe¢ cients for the less-industrialized countries are essentially identical in magnitude and statistical signi…cance to those in the original sample. The coe¢ cients for the highly industrialized countries are similar in magnitude, but they are not statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Size of IV vs. OLS estimates
In Table 6 , OLS estimates of the impact of disaster damage are consistently smaller in magnitude than the IV estimates, and are mostly not statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. In the discussion of the …rst-stage equation above, I hypothesized that intentional reporting biases may lead to downward bias in the estimated impact of damage on in ‡ows of resources from overseas: if in ‡ows are expected to be low for whatever reason, damage reports may be intentionally exaggerated to stimulate more in ‡ows. In addition, third factors such as worsening economic conditions or a breakdown of government functions may lead to declines in …nancial in ‡ows and an increase in disaster damage (if disasters occur), also generating a negative bias.
An alternative explanation for the di¤erence in the OLS and IV estimates is possible, however, that has nothing to do with reverse causation or omitted variables. The IV estimates isolate disaster damages that are due speci…cally to hurricanes, while the OLS estimates are for damages from all disasters. It may simply be that international ‡ows respond more to hurricane damage than to other types of damage, for whatever reason. One can test this hypothesis by repeating the OLS regressions of Table 6 for reported damages speci…cally from wind storms, the disaster type that includes hurricanes (as opposed to damage from all disasters).
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Appendix Table 1 presents regression results that are analogous to those in Panel A of Table   6 , but where variables for disaster damage as a share of GDP is replaced by disaster damage from wind storms as a share of GDP. If the di¤erence between Panel A (OLS estimates) and Panel B
(IV estimates) in Table 6 is due simply to the fact that …nancial ‡ows respond primarily to wind storms and not to other types of disasters, then the results in Appendix Table 1 should be similar to the IV results in Panel B of 
Other potential sources of bias
A central assumption underlying the instrumental variables estimates of the impact of disaster damage is that hurricanes only a¤ect the outcomes of interest (international …nancial ‡ows) via their e¤ect on disaster damage. This exclusion restriction would be violated if international …nancial ‡ows were responding to e¤ects of hurricanes other than recorded economic damages.
The most obvious other potential channels of hurricanes'impacts on in ‡ows are via the number of people killed, and via changes in economic activity (growth). In principle, the damage estimates reported in EM-DAT are meant to include the economic e¤ects of disaster deaths, and more broadly the e¤ects of disasters on economic activity. However, EM-DAT damage reports are explicitly de…ned as encompassing damages only in the year of the disaster, so that lagged e¤ects of disaster deaths, and lagged e¤ects on economic activity overall will not be included in the damage data. It is obvious that deaths have lagged economic e¤ects: those killed are no longer producing output. Disasters may also have lagged e¤ects on economic activity more broadly (that are not captured in the current damage data), to which international ‡ows may be responding.
Therefore, the damage estimates (particularly lagged damages) may understate the true economic damages.
In addition, international ‡ows may respond to non-economic motives. For example, foreign aid may respond simply to the number of deaths, independent of any assessment of the economic impact of those deaths.
If some lagged economic e¤ects of disasters are indeed not included in the disaster estimates, and if ‡ows do respond to deaths independent of their economic e¤ects, then the instrumental variables estimates of the impact of disaster damages presented so far will be overstated, as in ‡ows that are not directly caused by the observed damages will be attributed to them. One way to test whether this source of bias is important is to simply include as control variables in the IV regressions the number of people killed and changes in real GDP (and lags of these variables). 23 Gauging how inclusion of these controls a¤ects the IV estimates can provide insight into whether these alternative channels are operating, and if so, the direction of bias they generate.
If IV estimates decline substantially in magnitude upon inclusion of these controls for alternative channels, this would suggest that the original results are indeed overstated.
Appendix Table 2 presents regression results that are analogous to those in Panel B of Table 6 , except that controls are included for number of people killed in disasters (as share of population if years 5-7 before), the change in real GDP (current-year real GDP divided by mean real GDP 5-7 years before), and four lags of these variables. 24 As it turns out, the coe¢ cients on the damage 23 It is reasonable to believe that number of deaths and overall GDP will be substantially less prone to the type of measurement and misreporting issues that are likely to matter for the economic damage estimates. Deaths are presumably easier to identify and tabulate than economic damages. GDP estimates are generally arrived at using a more systematic methodology than often ad-hoc damage estimates. 24 The sample sizes of each regression are marginally smaller than those in Panel B of Table 6 because of missing population data for some observations. The regression estimates without control variables for these marginally smaller subsamples are essentially identical to those in Panel B of Table 6. variables tend to remain similar in size to the previous estimates after inclusion of these control variables, and in some cases they become even larger in magnitude. For example, the coe¢ cient on damage 2 years before in the ODA regression has become roughly a third larger in magnitude.
Essentially all the damage variables that statistically signi…cantly predicted international in ‡ows in Table 6 continue to do so here. 25 There appears to be little indication that alternative channels of hurricanes'impacts impart upward bias to the estimated coe¢ cients.
5 Discussion: magnitude of the results
How large are the estimated e¤ects of damages on international in ‡ows?
In particular, what is the 'replacement rate'of disaster damages by resource in ‡ows from overseas? Can we reject the null hypothesis of full insurance, that the replacement rate of combined international in ‡ows with respect to disaster damages is 1? In answering these question, it is useful to limit the sample for analysis to countries that have complete data on all four of the main outcome variables, and examine the impact of damages on total in ‡ows of funds from these sources combined. Table 8 presents instrumental variables regression estimates of equation (5) year before is of almost the same magnitude as before. In the ODA regression, the coe¢ cient on damages 2 years before remains statistically signi…cant (although now only at the 10% level), while the coe¢ cient on damages 3 years has now become statistically signi…cant at the 10% level.
The coe¢ cient on current damages in the remittance regression is now smaller by roughly a third in magnitude, but it remains statistically signi…cant at the 10% level.
The last column of the table presents coe¢ cient estimates for a regression where the outcome variable is the sum of the outcome variables in the …rst four columns-total net in ‡ows from ODA, net …nancial ‡ows, remittances, and FDI. The coe¢ cients on damages from the current year to 3 years after are all positive in sign, and the coe¢ cient on current damages is large (0.427) and statistically signi…cantly di¤erent from zero. This replacement rate of total current in ‡ows to current damages may be considered large: almost half of damages are replaced by current in ‡ows from overseas.
The sum of the individual regression coe¢ cients on all the damage variables in a particular regression is the replacement rate of disaster damages by in ‡ows within four years after the disaster (including the disaster year). This sum of coe¢ cients (and its standard error in parentheses) is reported at the bottom of the table for each outcome variable. It worth noting that the 4-year replacement rate via remittances, 0.284, is statistically signi…cant by itself, and the others are all positive in sign. The coe¢ cient sum in the last column is the replacement rate of total international in ‡ows from the four sources with respect to disaster damages. At 0.844, this is a large coe¢ cient, indicating a replacement rate of more than four-…fths within 4 years of disaster damage. Crucially, the null hypothesis that this coe¢ cient is equal to unity (full insurance) cannot be rejected: the t-statistic on this test is 0.38, with a p-value of 0.707.
Conclusion
Disasters exact a huge toll worldwide, both in terms of human casualties as well as economic losses. Until now, however, there has been no systematic assessment of the extent to which international resource ‡ows help bu¤er countries from disaster losses. This paper …lls this gap, focusing on hurricanes-one of the most common and destructive types of disasters.
Disaster damage reports are potentially endogenous, and in particular may be in ‡uenced by the desire to attract resource in ‡ows. To deal with this issue, I make use of instrumental variables constructed from meteorological data on hurricanes. Instrumental variables estimates indicate that disaster damages lead to increases in national-level net in ‡ows of o¢ cial development assistance, migrants' remittances, foreign lending, and foreign direct investment. I document both contemporaneous and lagged e¤ects of damages on resource in ‡ows. On average, total in ‡ows from these four sources amount to roughly four-…fths of estimated damages within four years after a disaster. The null hypothesis of full insurance of disaster damages by these types of international ‡ows cannot be rejected. By contrast, ordinary least squares estimates …nd essentially no response of international ‡ows to disaster damages, highlighting the importance of an instrumental variables approach in this context.
Valuable future work on this topic could use an analogous instrumental variables approach to understand the impact of damages from other types of disasters (such as earthquakes), to ascertain the generalizability of these results. In addition, it may be of broad interest to document the Table 3 for variable definitions and other notes. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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